Dynamic Group Key Agreement Protocol
Second, the protocol uses pseudo-identity instead of a true identity to create a secure D2D group session for privacy. Only users can assign the pseudo-identity to the corresponding real identity (RID). Users share a low-entropy crypto-system system with a public key, used to transfer information to the public channel and ensure the security of settings in the process of generating session keys. In summary, the DH-based group key protocol is commonly known as the GKA protocol. Although our protocol is based on DH, we do not classify it as a GKA protocol because of a controller`s key distribution function. Our proposed scheme offers the advantage of dynamics and collaborative contribution to the calculation of group keys with a modified key agreement method. First, identity authentication, also known as CRA-DGK, is proposed and demonstrated against external attacks without the service network and key MEMORANDUM of understanding. It combines group key agreements with signature schemes based on Gap Diffie Hellman groups [3] for secure D2D group communication. The CRA-DGK has the opportunity to note the presence of corrupt members, although it is not noticeable who is behaving badly among the members of the group. CODH has a director named Master. The director is also a member of the group. It consumes more energy than normal nodes for communication and operation of group key management. There will be a policy for the election of a leader.
On mobile networks, signal intensity, neighbourhood level, identity and resources (CPU, memory, battery and bandwidth) would be criteria for the Leader choice [19-21]. When a group is created, the first master is selected from among the group members and performs the initialization of the group key. Group members then select a new master`s degree when they receive a master`s notification for management group changes. Once a new group leader has been selected for group management, the previous master transmits information about group members to the new master. That is, a delegation process is carried out (see sections 3.3 and 3.4). On the other hand, there may be connection errors due to network isolation or denial-of-service attacks. (We assume that the group participants are honest and not compromised. However, they may be threatened by network opponents who can execute all network-based attacks.) We consider the connection error to be a kind of member output, whether the left node is a member or a master. The proof.
A locker received by the master of the group members is what a member of the group signs with his public key certified by a CERTIFICATION organization. Concretely, a locker is chopped by a single function like SHA-2, and Hash () is signed with the private key with a digital signature algorithm like RSA, DSA and ECDSA. The locker is then checked with the public key and certified by CA. If a non-member locker is included in a group`s locker list, it must be accompanied by a forged signature. This means that the problem arises in the event of a ha hashkollision attack or an unauthorized certification certificate [23]. Once all the checked lockers have been transferred to the Master, all other nodes that are not members of the group can restore the group key under the DH hypothesis (Theorme 4 and 5). The proof. When the membership is changed or the group key is updated, the group controller changes its own secret key to , which is a random number independently of each other.
it implies that it is impossible to find an algorithm without the knowledge of and .
